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COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
CENTURY PARK OFFICES, LTD., 
Plaintiff and Appellee, BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. 
WILLIAM R. BIRELEY, 
Case No. 900292-CA 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPEAL FROM FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j) because this is an 
appeal from a final judgment and order in a civil matter in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. This matter was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court 
to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-2-2(4) in an order dated October 11, 1990. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Notice to Pay Rent or Quit constituted an 
election by Century Park to terminate the lease. 
2. Whether Century Park deprived Bireley of possession of 
the leased premises and is consequently barred from claiming an 
enforceable lease after November 6, 1987. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The appellate court should review this question of law under 
a correction of error standard, giving no deference to the trial 
court. Provo City Corp. v. State of Utah, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 
9 (Utah 1990); In re D.S.K.. 133 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 16 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The Utah courts have not decided the issue presented on 
appeal in this case; therefore, defendant/appellant relies upon 
authority from Colorado: Aigner v. Cowell Sales Co., 660 P.2d 
907 (Colo. 1983) (copy attached); G.T. Investments v. Depot, 
Inc., 694 P.2d 379 (Colo. App. 1984); Duran v. Housing Authority, 
761 P.2d 180, 182 (Colo. 1988) ("it is established law in 
Colorado that the three-day notice to quit . . . constitutes an 
election by the landlord to terminate the lease"). 
RELATED APPEAL 
Appellant believes that W. Daniel English v. Standard 
Optical Co., Case No. 900422-CA, presently on appeal to this 
Court involves similar issues to the instant appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a final order of the Fourth District 
Court granting judgment to Century Park Offices, Ltd. and from 
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the Fourth District Court's final order denying appellant's 
Motion to Amend the Judgment. 
In its Memorandum Decision filed April 5, 1990, the trial 
court determined: 
(a) There was a valid lease between the parties; 
(b) The addendum requiring the lessee/defendant to pay 
for improvements to the leased property was unenforceable; 
(c) Based on defendant's failure to pay rent, lessor/ 
plaintiff served defendant with a Notice to Pay Rent or Quit; 
(d) Defendant elected to quit the premises pursuant to 
the Notice; 
(e) Despite the Notice and ensuing election of 
remedies, defendant remained liable to plaintiff for rental 
payments on the leased property for the duration of the lease 
term. (Court's Memorandum Decision, Addendum A.) 
Defendant timely moved this Court for an Order altering or 
amending the Judgment. Defendant requested only that the judg-
ment be amended to find that the Notice to Pay Rent or Quit 
constituted an election by the landlord to terminate the lease. 
In accordance with case law and with the default provision in the 
lease, defendant argued he should not be held responsible for 
rental payments accruing after the eviction. The court denied 
defendant's motion. 
The only issue before the Court on this Appeal is whether 
the lease was terminated at the time the Notice to Pay Rent or 
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Quit was served on defendant. Defendant agrees that damages 
incident to default prior to the eviction can be recovered; 
subsequent to the termination of the lease, the question of 
damages is not at issue. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are undisputed and are derived from the 
court's Memorandum Decision, the Trial Transcript and Exhibits 
and the pleadings on file. 
On December 14, 1985, appellant, William R. Bireley 
("Bireley"), and Century Park Offices, Ltd. ("Century Park"), 
entered into a lease agreement with respect to certain office 
space. Beginning in the fall of 1986, a conflict arose regarding 
who should pay for improvements to the leased office space. 
Bireley paid rent and utilities on the leased premises through 
and including March 1987 with the exception of February 1987. At 
the end of March, Bireley ceased paying rent. Beginning in 
April, Bireley sublet the premises in exchange for monthly 
payments of approximately one thousand dollars. 
On August 3, 1986, Century Park filed a lawsuit in the 
Fourth District Court demanding payment for the remodeling 
expenses it had incurred in connection with the leased office 
space. Not until January of 1990 did Century amend its Complaint 
to include a claim for unrecovered rent under the lease term. 
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Century Park served Bireley with a "Landlord's Notice to Pay 
Rent or Quit," addressed to both Bireley and his sublessee, 
Michael Blair ("Blair"), on November 3, 1987. (Notice, Addendum 
B.) The Notice is specific and it is stated in the disjunctive: 
either pay or deliver up possession. Given the alternatives, 
Bireley and Blair opted to quit the premises and delivered up 
possession of the office space to Century Park three days after 
receipt of the Notice. (Trial Transcript, pp. 28, 33, 71-2.) 
After November 6, 1987, Bireley never once returned to the leased 
premises; nor did he ever receive notice that rental payments 
were expected by Century Park for the duration of the lease term. 
(Transcript, p. 94.) 
The trial court found that Bireley was not liable to Century 
Park for the improvements to the property; this finding is not 
contested. However, the trial court held Bireley had a contin-
uing obligation under the terms of the lease agreement to pay 
rent despite the Notice to Pay Rent or Quit served in November 
1987. Bireley has satisfied his obligation for delinquent rent 
up until the time he and his sublessee quit the premises and now 
brings this appeal as to the rent claimed after the eviction 
notice was served. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Other jurisdictions considering the issue before this Court 
have held that a Notice to Pay Rent or Quit constitutes an 
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election by the landlord to terminate the lease. Those juris-
dictions hold that lessees are only liable for rent through the 
date they quit the premises upon receipt of notice by the lessor 
to pay or quit. 
Clear language is required to preserve the right of the 
lessor to continue to recover rent under a lease after a Notice 
to Pay Rent or Quit has been served upon the lessee. In this 
case, the default provisions of the lease specifically stated 
that the landlord had the right to "declare this lease terminated 
and the term ended and shall have the immediate right of re-
entry and may remove all persons and property from the leased 
premises." (Lease Agreement, Addendum C, p. 7, H 30.) Defendant 
had no way of knowing that the eviction constituted an interim 
procedure. All indications pointed to the fact that the Notice 
to Pay Rent or Quit gave him the option of either paying withheld 
rent or quitting the premises. He opted to quit. Thus, the 
Notice constituted an election on the part of the landlord to 
terminate the lease. 
Specifically, defendant had absolutely no knowledge that 
plaintiff expected him to remain liable under the terms of the 
lease. Not until January of this year, was plaintiff's Complaint 
amended to include a claim for unrecovered rent under the lease 
term. Thus, from November 3, 1987 through January of 1990, 
plaintiff never notified defendant of his obligation under the 
lease, never billed defendant for any rental amounts, and never 
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claimed any amounts as past due or owing. Further, defendant was 
not in possession. It defies common sense as well as common law 
principles to suggest defendant was bound by the lease, when he 
received absolutely nothing in exchange; was not made aware of 
his obligations; and had every reason to believe the lease had 
been terminated. 
At the very least, plaintiff had an affirmative respon-
sibility to advise defendant that it was only attempting to 
collect rent pursuant to notice; that quitting the premises was 
not an election; and that relinquishing possession did not 
terminate the lease. Century Park failed to do so. Bireley 
should not be held liable for the full lease term after he quit 
the premises pursuant to notice. 
POINT I 
THE LEASE WAS UNENFORCEABLE AFTER OCTOBER 
1987 SINCE THE NOTICE TO PAY RENT OR QUIT 
CONSTITUTED AN ELECTION BY CENTURY PARK TO 
TERMINATE THE LEASE. 
The issue of termination of the lease agreement was raised 
during the bench trial because of the language contained in the 
"Notice to Pay Rent or Quit" which was served on defendant. This 
Court noted in its Memorandum Decision that "that language could 
be interpreted as an election of remedies." (Memorandum 
Decision, Addendum A.) But the Court went on to conclude that 
"after examination of the default provision in the lease, and the 
notice served on defendant, the Court finds that plaintiff's 
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intent in serving that notice was only an attempt to seek the 
rent due at that time, and was not intended as an election which 
would preclude future damages." Id. Defendant brings this 
appeal on the basis that the "Notice to Pay Rent or Quit" was an 
election of remedies by the plaintiff which effectively 
terminated the lease. 
The default provision in the lease provides that: 
In the event of any failure of tenant to pay any rental 
due hereunder within fifteen days after the same shall 
be due . . . the landlord, besides other rights and 
remedies it may have in law and equity, shall have the 
right to relet and collect the deficiency, the right to 
collect immediately for damages and shall have the 
right to declare this lease terminated and the term 
ended and shall have the Immediate right of re-entry 
and may remove all persons and property from the leased 
premises. . . . 
(Entire Lease Agreement included as Addendum C.) This default 
provision gives the landlord the right to declare the lease 
terminated in the event the tenant should fall behind in rental 
payments due. That is in fact what the landlord did when it 
issued its "Notice to Pay Rent or Quit." The Notice constituted 
an election by the landlord to terminate the lease unless the 
tenant paid rent. 
While Utah courts have not addressed this specific issue, it 
is the general rule in Colorado that a "Notice to Pay or Quit" 
"constitutes an election by the landlord to terminate the lease 
unless the Notice is rendered ineffective by the tenant's payment 
of rent." Alqner v. Cowell Sales Co., 660 P.2d 907, 908 (Colo. 
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1983). Accord. G.T. Investments v, Depot. Inc., 690 P.2d 379 
(Colo. App. 1980); Duran v. Housing Authority, 761 P.2d 180 
(Colo. 1988). 
Other jurisdictions faced with this specific issue have also 
held that a Notice to Pay Rent or Quit constitutes an election of 
remedies; if the tenant quits the premises in response, the lease 
is terminated and the tenant is no longer liable for the lease 
term. See, for example. Price v. S.S. Fuller, Inc., 639 P.2d 
1003 (Alaska 1982). The facts of this case clearly support 
application of the Colorado rule. 
Specifically, in Aigner, the Colorado Supreme Court 
considered facts similar to those raised here. Cowell, the 
landlord, leased two units in a shopping center to Aigner. The 
term of the lease was from May 5, 1978 until April 30# 1981. On 
May 2, 1979, Cowell served Aigner with a "Demand for Payment of 
Rent or Possession" because Aigner was delinquent in his rent. 
Within three days, Aigner vacated the premises. Cowell leased 
the premises to a new tenant on August 1, 1979. 
Subsequently, Cowell brought an action against Aigner to 
recover rent due under the lease for the months May, June and 
July, 1979. But the Colorado Supreme Court held that the notice 
to pay or quit constituted an election by the landlord to termi-
nate the lease unless the tenant paid rent. Id. at 908. "The 
lessor's notice was 'analogous to a notice which one who is a 
party to any terminable contract gives in order to rescind it at 
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law, as distinguished from equity.1" Id. at 909 (quoting Barlow 
v. Hoffman. 103 Colo. 286, 86 P.2d 239, 201 (1938)). The court 
went on to conclude that Aigner was liable for rent only through 
the date he quit the premises. Id. 
Further, it is simply unfair to require defendant to pay 
rent for the entire term of the lease when he relied upon plain-
tiffs "Notice to Pay Rent or Quit." The "Notice to Pay or Quit" 
served upon defendant provided specifically: "Delivering up 
possession in no way releases the debtors for the delinquent rent 
and utilities." Defendant does not dispute that he owes delin-
quent rent up until the time he and his sublessee quit the 
premises.1 However, defendant objects to this Court's holding 
which requires him to pay rent for the entire duration of the 
lease, since he quit the premises within three days of being 
given the option to do so on November 3, 1987. 
The Montana Supreme Court has said that: "]n the absence of 
clear language expressly preserving such a right, courts 
generally will not construe a lease as providing that, upon 
reentry or forfeiture, the tenant shall remain liable for accrued 
rent." Knioht v. OMI Corp., 170 Mont. 72, 568 P.2d 552, 550 
(1977). The Colorado Supreme Court of Appeals has likewise 
concluded that: 
*In fact, Bireley has already paid Century Park rent due 
prior to November, 1987; Partial Satisfaction of Judgment, 
stipulated to by the parties May 31, 1990. 
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[I]n the absence of express provisions in the lease 
granting the landlord the right, upon re-entry or 
forfeiture, to look to the tenant for unaccrued rent, a 
tenant who vacates the premises in compliance with 
landlord's Notice to Pay or Quit, is not liable for 
rent due under a lease for subsequent months during 
which landlord was unable to rent the premises. 
First National Bank of Boston v. Dvkstra, 680 P.2d 957, 958 
(Colo. App. 1980); Accord. Aianer, 660 P.2d at 907; Price. 639 
P.2d 1006. 
The landlord's "Notice to Pay Rent or Quit" gave defendant 
an option. Defendant chose to quit the premises knowing that in 
doing so he would be responsible for delinquent rent and 
utilities. If plaintiff intended to hold defendant responsible 
for rent and utilities for the entire term of the lease, even if 
defendant exercised the option to quit, that should have been 
clearly stated in the "Notice to Pay Rent or Quit." Plaintiff 
had a responsibility to advise defendant that it was only 
attempting to collect rent; that quitting the premises was not an 
option; and that relinquishing possession did not terminate the 
lease. 
If defendant had realized that he would be responsible for 
rent and utilities for the entire term of the lease, he would 
have at least made use of the premises himself, or would have 
left the sublessee, Michael Blair, in possession so that he could 
continue to collect the rent money from Blair. Defendant relied 
upon the landlord's representation that he had an option and 
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changed his position in reliance upon the "Notice to Pay Rent or 
Quit." 
It would be patently unfair to hold that Bireley "lost all 
rights, but retained all obligations of the contract." Executive 
House Bldg., Inc. v. Optimum Systems, Inc., 311 So.2d 604, 607 
(La. App. 1975) (holding the lessor could not demand payment of 
rent for the unexpired term and at the same time assert its right 
to possession of the leased premises). Accordingly, defendant is 
not liable for rent which accrued subsequent to his quitting the 
premises in response to the Notice to Pay or Quit. 
POINT II 
CENTURY PARK'S REPOSSESSION OF THE LEASED 
PREMISES PRECLUDED THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
LEASE AGREEMENT SINCE THERE WAS NO 
CONSIDERATION HOLDING BIRELEY TO THE TERMS. 
It is fundamental that a lease, like any other contract, 
requires consideration to be given by both parties. In exchange 
for a tenant's agreement to pay rent, the landlord must deliver 
consideration to the tenant in the form of possession of the 
property. The characteristics of a lease contract in the common 
law include "a conveyance of a right of exclusive possession." 
Bentlev v. Palmer House Co., 332 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1960); Bodden 
v. Carbonell, 350 So.2d 927 (Fla. App. 1978); Gage v. Citv of 
Topeka, 468 P.2d 232 (Kan. 1970); Wash-o-Matic Laundry Corp. v. 
621 Lefferts Ave. Corp., 82 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1908); Restatement 
Second of Property-Landlord and Tenantf Section 1.2 (1977). 
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In the absence of this consideration from the landlord there 
cannot be an enforceable lease. As the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals has stated, "A lease is partly the conveyance of an 
estate, which is deemed fully executed once the tenant takes 
possession." Matter of Hinaes, 602 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1979). 
"[I]f the lessee is deprived of peaceable possession, the 
consideration for the contract fails. It necessarily follows the 
lessee's obligation to pay rent for these rights and privileges 
conferred by the lease is extinguished." Executive House Bldcr., 
Inc. v. Optimum Systems, Inc., supra, 311 So.2d at 607. 
The evidence is unrefuted that on or about November 6, 1987, 
Century Park took possession of the premises and never again 
offered or conveyed possession to Bireley. Because the evidence 
at trial indicates Century Park never gave any consideration to 
Bireley in exchange for a promise to continue to pay rent for the 
duration of the lease term, there is no basis for any finding 
that the lease was enforceable beyond the election to terminate 
in November 1987. It simply makes no sense to suggest Bireley 
would agree to be bound under the lease for three additional 
years in exchange for nothing. This is particularly true in 
light of the fact he had profitably sublet the premises to Blair. 
CONCLUSION 
Once the plaintiff, Century Park, gave Bireley the option to 
pay rent or quit the premises, and once the defendant, Bireley, 
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opted to quit and delivered possession there was no longer an 
enforceable lease between the parties. The Notice constituted an 
election of remedies which terminated the lease. The facts 
indicate both parties acted as if this were the mutual under-
standing until plaintiff prepared a pretrial order raising a 
claim for rent due for the entire lease term. Case law directly 
on point and common sense notions of equity require defendant 
should not be held liable for payments after he quit the premises 
pursuant to receiving Notice to Pay or Quit. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this T^W day of November, 1990. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
y 
By 
George A. Hunt 
Elizabeth King 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum "A" Trial Courtfs Memorandum Decision 
Addendum "B" Notice to Pay Rent or Quit 
Addendum "C" Lease Agreement 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
********** 
CENTURY PARK OFFICES, LTD.f 
Plaintiffs, Case Number CV. 86-2213 
-vs- RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
WILLIAM R. BIRELEY, 
Defendants. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
********** 
The Court, having conducted a bench trial on the 
issues of back rents and utilities, damages, and payment for 
improvements will award plaintiff a judgment of $36,947.51. 
This judgment is for back rents and damages and utility 
payments plus interest and a late payment through the end of 
February of 1990. The Court will retain jurisdiction to award 
any future damages between March 1st, 1990 and the end of the 
lease term. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha, 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 
1989). The Court will not make an award for improvements. 
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the Court 
finds that a valid lease exists between plaintiff and 
defendant, and that that lease has not been terminated. The 
issue of termination is raised because of the language used in 
the notice to quit which was served on defendant. That 
language could be interpreted as an election of remedies. 
After examination of the default provision in the lease, and 
the notice served on defendant, the Court finds that 
plaintiff's intent in serving that notice was only an attempt 
to seek the rent due at that time, and was not intended as an 
election which would preclude future damages. Because the 
Court cannot award speculative future damages, the notice only 
referred to the rent owing at that time. Reid at 908. The 
fact that plaintiff has since relet the premises does not 
ADDENDUM "A" 
release defendant from his obligations and instead serves only 
to mitigate damages. Reid at 906. Because the lease was not 
terminated, defendant is responsible for the payments under 
the lease for rents and utilities which after subtracting the 
rents received from subsequent tenants, and adding the late 
penalty and interest charges provided in the agreement amount 
to $36,947.51. 
After consideration of the evidence presented 
regarding payment for improvements, the Court finds that the 
addendum providing for payment for those improvements was not 
part of the lease agreement. Mr. Home, the president of the 
plaintiff Corporation was experienced in real estate matters 
and should have known that an unsigned addendum is not valid. 
The Court further finds that the lease has an integration 
clause which was unmodified. To become a valid part of the 
lease, the integration clause would have to have been modified 
to allow for the addendum. The Court finds that defendant is 
not responsible for the cost of the improvements. 
Plaintiff is only entitled to attorneys fees for time 
expended in pursuing the back rents and damages pursuant to 
the Contract. Plaintiff is therefore awarded $1800.00 as 
attorneys fees. Plaintiff is awarded costs« 
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a judgment consistent with the terms 
of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for 
approval as to form prior to submission to the court for 
signature. 
Dated this 15th day of March, 1920. 
BY 
RA 
cc: George A. Hunt, Esq. 
Robert Moody, Esq. 
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HARDING, JUDGE 
LANDLORD'S NOTICE TO PAY RENT OR QUIT 
7o. .William R. Birelej and Jtochael E. B^ir „ 
You are hereby notified and required within three days from mrnct of this notice to pty the rent 
of the premises hereinafter described, and of which you now hold posmsion, amounting to the turn of 
Twelve Thousand .Six Hundred Ninety-Seven...and..43/ 100-^x>oL1Ats, being the amount now due 
and owing to"Cen.turj..P»^k..01£ic«sJ..Lt.cl.. by you for..Nineteen ......months* reniJ2roau& i t i e £ 
first... day of APEH
 f 19.86.., to the &£»£. day of 
...October
 > 1987 f or in the alternative to deliver up pnameion of the eame 
to... Landlord or ...Pe.tS.r...U.raQn _ agent, ar...JM..~ Jhall institute legal 
proceedings against you to recover possession of aaid pmniaes, with treble rata. 
Said premises are situate in Pt.PYQ , county of fltah. 
S:cte of V:ah and described as foilrws. to wit: 2696 .N....University Aye. 
Delivering up possession in no way releases the debtors. f or. the delinquent..rent^ 
and u t i l i t i e s . 
des.gr-*** and kno*r. as No.Suite. #270.f 
Dated October 23rd
 t 19. 8.7. 
Po»« NO ias - t-AHOLono • Nonet - K*m e» . • • w vr* •« a^att 
ADDENDUM "B" 
LEASE AGREEMENT 
This Lease Agreement i s wade t h i s * 3 day of 
p ^ f ^ f c e % , 1 9 i £ f by and between C#^Vjfv^rk ftffr^ 
L_«rrN, . the address of which is O ^ L . J^. 
U U I U A ^ . U M »^^p fWrft ^<^K « (hereinafter called 
•Landlord) # and LJ.UI.^ ft TfTrri ^ , 
the address of which (• te ff L7D ^/»AJ^.. tJu.^.v-ft^ f*vc* 
- (hereinafter called 
•Tenant*)f 
WITNESSETHi 
1* LEASED PREMISES. Landlord, in consideration of the 
rent to be paid and the covenants to be performed by Tenant, 
does hereby demise and leaae unto Tenant, and Tenant hereby 
rents from Landlord, all those premises situate, lying and 
being in the City of Provo, County of Utah, State of Utah, 
and more particularly described as follows, to-witt 
Suite *23Q of Horn* Financial Center . Building 
No,, 2, a Condominium otxlce building at 
about 2696 North UniveLSity Avenue, Trovo, 
Utah, consisting of •approximately ^ g x 
square feet of the &<*c^x3zgl floor of 
said building. Space will be measured to 
include perimeter walls rxcept in the case 
of divider partitions, and tenant shall pay 
the same rental rate as provided for in 
Paragraph 3 on its pro-rata share of common 
area as the square footage above indicated 
bears to the total square footage of the 
building. 
2. TERM. The rental term of this lease shall commence 
on the date of completion of said premises, no later than the 
£ir6t day of or on the opening by 
tenant of its business in the leased premises if prior to 
total completion and shall be for a period of r<uV yj^wp^ . H^ 
Each of the parties hereto agrees, upon demand of the other, 
to execute a declaration, in recordable form, expressing the 
commencement and termination dates of the term as soon ^B the 
commencement, and termination dates have been determined. 
3. RENT. Tenant covenants and agrees to pay to 
Landlord, its representatives and assigns, as rental for said 
premises, the sum of *S1£LJLLJQLL _ per square lo»t per 
month, monthly in advance, on the last day of each preceedlng 
month during said term, as well as the last month's rent at 
the time of signing this lease, the receipt of which 1L 
hereby acknowledged by Li'miJord. Should the rental term of 
this lease commence on a day other than the first day of a 
calendar month, then the rental for such month shall be pro-
rated upon a daily basis based upon a thirty 130) day 
calendar month* 
4. ADDITIONAL AREAS. The use and occupancy by Tenant 
of the leased premises chall Include the use in common, with 
others entitled thereto, of the common areas, parking a*cas, 
loading facilities, sidewalks and ri'Stomer car parking treac 
and of cuch oth?" facilitiea as may be designated from time 
to time by Landlord, subject however, to the terms and 
conditions of this Agreement and to reasonable rules and 
regulations for the use thereof as prescribed from time to 
time by the Landlord. Tenant and its employees shall park 
their cars only in areas specifically designated from tiae to 
time by Landlord for that purpose. 
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ADDENDUM "C" 
5. LEASE EXPIRATION. This lease and the tenancy hereby 
created shall cease at the end of the rental term hereof, or 
any extension or renewal thereof, without the necessity of 
any notice from cither Landlord or Tenant to terminate the 
same, and Tenant hereby valves notice to vacate the premises 
and agrees that Landlord shall be entitled to the benefit of 
all provisions of the lav respecting the summary recovery of 
possession of premises from a Tenant holding over to the same 
extent as if statutory notice has been given. 
6. EXCUSE OF LANDLORD'S PERFORMANCE. Anything in this 
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding, providing such 
cause is not due to the willful act or neglect of the 
Landlord, the Landlord shall not be deemed in default vith 
respect to the performance of any of the terms, covenants and 
conditions of this lease, if same shall be due to any strike, 
lockout, civil commotion, var-like operation, invasion, 
rebellion, hostilities, military or usurped pover, sabatage, 
governmental regulations or controls, inability to obtain any 
material, service or financing. Act of Cod, or other cause 
beyond the control of Landlord. 
7. REAL PROPERTY TAXES. Landlord shall be responsible 
for the payment of all real property taxes and assessments 
vhich may be levied or assessed by any lawful authority 
against the land and building comprising the office project. 
However, Tenant shall be responsible for any increase in real 
property taxes above the 1963 amuunt on all buildings, 
ground, common areas, etc. based upon the fraction that each 
tenant or ownet's square footage bears to the total square 
footage of leasable area. 
8. ALL OTHER TAXES. Tenant shall be exclusively liable 
for all other taxes and governmental charges of every kind 
and nature whatsoever assessed against the premises, or upon 
the personal property or trade fixtures or inventory suffered 
or permitted by Tenant to be located upon the premises. 
9. LATE RENT CHARGES. If Tenant shall fail to pay 
within IS days after due and payable any rent or any other 
amounts or charges, taxes, etc., Tenant shall pay a late fee 
equal to ten percent (101) of such past Uue amount, and in 
addition. Tenant shall pay interest from the due date of such 
past due amounts to the date of payment, both before and 
after judgment at a rate equal to the greater of Eighteen 
percent (16%) per annum or two percent (2D over the "prime 
rate* charged by Chase Manhattan Bank of Nev York at the due 
date of such payment; provided however, that in any case the 
maximum amount or rate of interest to be charged shall not 
exceed the maximum non-usurious rate in accordance vith 
applicable lav. 
10f CONSTRUCTION OF LEASED PREMISES. Lan*«Fd agrees 
prior to thesNqom.aencement of the rental tera^of this lease, 
at Landlord's ^<4e cost and expense/ to construct the 
building in vhirh^ fct^ e leased presses are to be located. 
Said leased premises *h*ll be^ -ctTnstructed substantially in 
accordance vith the speculations attached hereto and in 
title specifications vhi*ff aN^made a part hereof. Tenant 
agrees that no minoj^ -fTianges fram said specifications vhich 
may be necessary^ouring construction of the building or 
leased premises shall affect or ^change this Lease or 
invalidate safne. Landlord shall also crt*e to be constructed 
the necessary footvays and paiking lot facilities upon the 
site. >The parties hereto agree that tenantVL occupancy of 
saidxpremises as a tenant shall constitute form&L acceptance 
t>af the same are in the condition called for^>«eunder, 
except for any items specifically excepted in vritingSit date 
of occupancy as •incomplete*. ^ v 
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11. EXTENSION OP TIME. If Landlord, for any reason 
whatsoever, cannot deliver possession of the premises to 
Tenant at the commencement of the term specified above, then 
the term fox completion by Landlord of the premises shall be 
extended for sixty (60) days, which extension shall also 
result in a proportionate reduction of rent covering the 
period between the commencement of said term and the time 
when Landlord can deliver possession. If Landlord cannot 
deliver possession during said €0 day extension, then Tenant 
shall have the option to terminate this lease. Failure of 
Landlord to complete the building at the time specified in 
the contract will not give rise to any claim by Tenant as 
against Lsndlord or against any contractor employed by 
Landlord for damages that may be caused by said delay. 
12. LENDER APPROVAL. If Landlord is able to obtain 
financing for this project only upon the basis of 
modifications of the terms and provisions of this Lease, then 
Landlord shall have the right to cancel this Lease, if the 
Tenant refuses to approve in writing any such modifications 
within fifteen (15) days after Landlord's request therefore. 
If Landlord chooses to exercise said right of cancellation, 
this lease shall thereafter be null and void, and any money 
or security deposited heceunder shall be returned to Tenant 
and neither party shall have any liability to the other by 
reason of such cancellation. 
13. PERMITTED USES. Tenant shall occupy the leased 
premises and use same during the continuance of this lease 
solely for the purposes of office space or for any other use 
permitted under the zoning ordinances applicable to said 
location as may be approved by Landlord, which approval will 
not be unreasonably withheld. 
14. MAINTENANCE OF PREMISES. Tenant agrees to keep the 
premises under its control clean and free from rubbage and 
dirt at all times and shall not penetrate the exterior walls, 
roofs, sidewalks or other areavays adjacent to the premises 
without the prior written consent of Landlord. 
Tenant further agrees 10 deliver up said premises to 
Landlord at the expiration of said term in as good order and 
condition as when the same were entered upon by Lessee, 
reasonable use and wear thereof and damage by the elements 
excepted. 
15. SUBLETTING, CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP 8Y TENANT AND 
ASSIGNING. Tenant agrees not to assign this lease in whole 
or in part, nor sublet all or any part of the leased 
premises, nor mortgage nor encumber this lease or any part of 
the leased premises, nor enter into licenses or concession 
agreements or in other manner permit the occupation of or 
sharing of possession of any part of the premises, nor any 
assignment of this lease or any estate or Interest therein 
(all of the foregoing being hereafter referred to as 
"Assignment*) without the prior written consent of Landlord, 
which consent may not be withheld unreasonable; subject 
however, to the additional option of Landlord to terminate as 
set forth hereinafter. Any assignment by operation of law, 
or if the tenant be a corporation, unincorporated association 
or partnership, the transfer, assignment or hypothication of 
any stock or interest in such corporation, association or 
partnership in the aggregate in excess of twenty five percent 
(25%) shall be deemed an assignment within the meaning of 
this paragraph. 
In the event Tenant desires to make any such assignment, 
Tenant shall serve written notice upon Landlord, and Landlord 
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shall have sixty (€0) days to elect whether to approve such 
assignment or to terminate the lease. Should Landlord elect 
to terminate. Landlord shall so notify Tenant in writing and 
Tenant shall have fifteen (15) days either to rescind the 
request, or the lease shall b* deemed terminated effective at 
the end of the calendar month when Landlord so elects to 
terminate. Tenant's notice shall be accompanied by a copy of 
a bona fide offer from a potential 'Assignee- specifying the 
terms of any offer for such 'Assignee*• Should consent be 
granted, such consent shall be subject to Tenant causing the 
'Assignee* to execute an agreement directly with Landlord 
undertaking to be bound by all of the terms, convenants and 
conditions contained in the lease as though "Assignee* had 
originally executed this lease as Tenant. 
At no time when Tenant is in default the performance of 
any covenant of this Lease or In payment of rent or any other 
matured sums payable hereunder, shall any assignment be 
approved or permitted, nor shall the notice provision above-
provided limit the right to declare default and pursue other 
remedies provided for in this Lease or under the laws of the 
State of Utah. 
Consent by Landlord to one or more assignments shall not 
constitute a waiver nor consent to any subsequent assignment 
nor exhaust Landlord's right as provided under any remedies 
in this Lease Agreement. Any assignment without Landord's 
consent shall be void and of no force and effect and shall 
confer no estate or benefit of anyone, nor shall Landlord be 
required to cancel the leaae in order to invalidate such 
assignment and the acceptance by Landlord of any rents or any 
other payment from "Assignee* shall not be deemed a waiver or 
consent by Landlord or an acceptance of such assignment. 
The consent of Landlord shall not relieve Tenant or any 
guarantors from continuing liability under this lease. 
The documentation of any such assignment shall be 
prepared by Landlord or its attorneys and all costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees related thereto shall be payed by 
Tenant to Landlord upon demand as additional rent. 
16. USE OF COMMON AREAS* All common areas and 
facilities not within the described leased premises, which by 
virtue of this Lease Tenant may be permitted to use and 
occupy, are to be used and occupied under a revocable 
license, ind if the amount of such areas be demini6hed, 
Landlord shall not be subject to any liabilities nor shall 
Tenant be entitled to any compensation or diminution or 
abatement of rent, nor shall such diminution of such areas be 
deemed constructive or actual eviction. 
17. MODIFICATIONS BY TENANT. Tenant shall not make or 
cause to be made any alterations, additions, or Improvements 
to the leased premises, or install or cause to be Installed 
any exterior signs, floor covering, antennas, interior or 
exterior lighting, plumbing fixtures, shades, canopies or 
awnings or make any changes to the exterior of the premises 
without the prior written approval of Landlord. Tenant shall 
present to Landlord any plans or specifications for such work 
at the time approval lr. sought. Tenant shall promptly pay 
all contractors and material men so as to minimise the 
possibility of a lien attaching to the leased premises, and 
should any r.uch lien be made or filed, Tenant shall bond 
against or discharge the same within ten (10) days after 
written request by Landlord. 
IB. LANDLORD'S MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES. Landlord 
shall be responsible (as originally installed by Landlord 
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pursuant to its obligations hereunder) for maintenance of 
roof, exterior walls, structural repair, exterior painting, 
yard surfacing, plumbing equipment, electrical equipment, 
heating and sir conditioning equipment, trash removal, snow 
removal and glass breakage except that Landlord shall not be 
called upon to make any such repairs occasioned by the act or 
negligence of Tenant, Its agents, employees, invitees, 
licensees or contractors, except to the extent that Landlord 
is reimbursed therefore under any policy of insurance 
permitting waiver of subrogation in advance of loss* 
Landlord shall not be required to make any other Improvements 
or repairs until Tenant, in writing has notified Landlord of 
the condition requiring repair. 
19. TENANT'S MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES. Tenant 
shall be responsible for all interior decoration, light 
globes and tubes, interior walls, floors and ceilings. If 
Tenant refuses or neglects to commence to complete repairs 
promptly and adequately. Landlord may, but shall not be 
required to do so, make and complete said repairs and Tenant 
shall pay the costs thereof to Landlord upon demand. 
20. UTILITIES. Landlord shall be responsible for 
water, sewer, and fire insurance on the building. Tenant 
shall be responsible for all power utilized by Tenant, heat, 
telephone, janatorial, and fire insurance, on personal 
property. Te4titoV*U*t\ be WL*p*a«Mfcl« fefWi cFh* fen>l fciU 
21. SURRENDER OF PREMISES. At the termination of the 
tenancy hereby created, Tenant shall deliver to Landlord the 
leased premises in the same condition as the leased premises 
were in upon delivery of possession thereof to Tenant, 
together with Landlord's approved remodeling, reasonable wear 
and tear accepted, and damage by unavoidable casualty 
accepted, and shall surrender all keys for the leased 
premises to Landlord at the place then fixed for the payment 
of rent and shall Inform Landlord of all combinations to 
locks, safes and vaults, if any, in the leased premises. 
Tenant rhall remove all its trade fixtures before 
surrendering the premises and shall repair any damage to the 
leased premises caused thereby. Tenants obligations to 
observe or perform this covenant shall survive the expiration 
or other termination of the term of this lease. 
22. LIABILITY INSURANCE. Tenant shall, during the 
entire term of this lease, keep in full force and effect a 
policy of public liability and property damage insurance with 
respect to the leased premises, and the business operated by 
Tenant and any sub-tenants of Tenant in the leased premises, 
in which the limits for public liability shall be not less 
than One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00) per accident, and in 
which the limits for property damage liability shall be not 
less than One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00). The 
policy shall name Landlord, any persons, firms or 
corporations designated by Landlord and Tenant as Insureds, 
and shall contain a clause that the insurer will not cancel 
or change the insurance without first giving the Landlord ten 
(10) days prior written notice. Such Insurance may be 
furnished by Tenant under any blanket policy carried by it or 
under a separate policy therefore. Evidence of said 
insurance shall be delivered to Landlord and if Tenant fails 
to provide such insurance Landlord may do so and charge same 
to Tenant. 
23. OFF-SET STATEMENT. Tenant agrees within ten (10) 
days after request therefore by Landlord to execute in 
recordable form and deliver to Landlord a statement in 
writing, certifying 
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(a) That this lease is in full force and effect, 
(b) The date of commencement of the term of this 
lease, 
(c) That rent is paid currently without any off-
set or defense thereto, 
(d) The amount of rent, if sny, paid in advance, 
and 
(e) That there are no uncured defaulta by Landlord 
or stating those claimed by Tenant. 
24. ATTORNMENT. Tenant shall, in the event any 
proceedings are brought for the foreclosure of, or in the 
event of exercise of the power of sale under any mortgage or 
deed of trust made by Landlord covering the leaaed premiaes, 
attorn to the purchaser upon any such foreclosure or sale and 
recognize such purchaser as the Landlord under this lease. 
25. SUBORDINATION. Tenant agrees that this Leaae 
shall, at the request of Landlord, be subordinate to any 
first mortgages or deeds of trust that may hereafter be 
placed upon said premises and to any and all advances to be 
made thereunder, and to the interest thereon, and any 
renewals, replacements and extensions thereof, provided the 
mortgagees or trustees named in said mortgages or deeds of 
trust shall agree to recognize the Lease of Tenant in the 
event of foreclosure, if Tenant is not in default. 
26. EXECUTION BY LANDLORD. Tenant hereby irrevocably 
appoints Landlord as attorney-in-fact for the Tenant for full 
power and authority to execute and deliver in the name of the 
Tenant any such offset, attornment and subordination 
instruments upon failure of the Tenant to execute and deliver 
any of the above instruments within fifteen (15) days after 
written request so to do by Landlord; and such failure shall 
constitute a breach of this lease entitling the Landlord, at 
its option, to cancel this Lease and terminate the Tenant's 
Interest therein. 
27. WASTE OR NUISANCE. Tenant shall not commit or 
suffer to be committed any waste upon the leased premises, or 
any nuisance or other act or thing which may disturb the 
quiet enjoyment of any other tenant in the building in which 
the leaaed premises may be located. 
2B. DESTRUCTION OP LEASED PREMISES. The parties hereto 
agree that should the premises herein described be destroyed 
during the term of this lease or any extensions or renewals 
thereof to such an extent that the same cannot be put into 
tenantable condition by Landlord within a reasonable time 
then and in that event either party shall have the right to 
the return of all advanced unused rentals, provided, however, 
that should Lessor be able to restore the premises to a 
tenantable condition within a reasonable time from said 
destruction, then Tenant shall not be entitled to cancel said 
lease, but shall not be obligated to pay rent for that period 
during which the premises are being restored to said 
tenantable condition; and provided, further, that should 
Tenant be able to occupy a portion of the premises for the 
purposes of this Lease during such time as the same are being 
restored to the original condition by Landlord, then and in 
that event, Tenant shall pay rent for the portion of the 
premises being co ured in proportion to the rent for the 
entire demised premises, such rent to be pro-rated on the 
basis of square footage. Landlord shall have the election 
not to repair or rebuild said building and shall, within. 
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•incty (90) days after the occurence of such damage or 
destruction, give Tenant notice of its intention to repair 
and shall then proceed with reasonable speed to repair. 
Tenant shall be solely responsible for Tenant's trade 
fixtures, inventory and personal property and Landlord's 
reconstruction obligation shall not include murals, works of 
art, or abnormal decorative treatments of Tenant's premises. 
29. EMINENT DOHAIK. All damages that may be awarded 
for a taking under the power of eminent domain, whether for 
the whole or a part of the leased premises, shall belong to 
and be the property of Landlord whether such damages shall be 
awarded as compensation for diminuition in value to the 
leasehold or to the fee of the premises; provided, however 
that Landlord shall not be entitled to the award made to 
Tenant for loss of business, depreciation to, and cost of 
removal of stock and fixtures, and if the whole of the 
premises hereby leased shall be taken under the power of 
eminent domain then the term of this lease shall cease aa of 
the day possession shall be taken and the rent shall be paid 
up to that day with a proportionate refund by Landlord or 
such rent as may have been paid in advance. If less than the 
whole is taken then the rental shall be reduced in proportion 
to the amount of the leased premises taken. 
30. DEFAULT. In the event of any failure of Tenant to 
pay any rental due hereunder within fifteen (IS) days after 
the same shall be due, or any failure to perform any other of 
the terms, conditions or covenants of this lease to be 
observed or performed by Tenant for more than thirty (30) 
days after written notice of such default shall have been 
mailed to Tenant, or if premises become and remain vacant and 
abandoned by Tenant or if Tenant permits this lease to be 
taken under any Writ of Execution, or in the event of the 
insolvency of Tenant or of any guarantor of the lease, then 
the Landlord, besides other rights or remedies it may have in 
law and equity, shall have the right to relet and collect a 
deficiency, the right to collect immediately for damages and 
shall have the right to declare this lease terminated antf the 
term ended and shall have the immediate right of re-entry and 
may remove all persons and property from the leased premises 
and such property may be removed and stored in a public 
warehouse or elsewhere at the cost of, and for the account of 
Tenant, without evidence of notice or resort to legal process 
and without being deemed guilty of trespass, or becoming 
liable for any loss or damage which may be occassioned 
thereby. 
31. LEGAL EXPENSES. In the event of default by either 
party hereunder, the defaulting party hereby agrees to pay 
all costs incurred in enforcing this agreement or any right 
arising out of the breach thereof, whether by suit or 
otherwise, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
32. WAIVER OF REDEMPTION FLIGHTS. Tenant hereby waives 
any rights of redemption granted by or under any present or 
future laws in the event of Tenant's being evicted or 
dispossessed for any cause, or in the event of Landlord's 
obtaining possession of the premises by reason of the 
violation by Tenant, of any of the covenants or conditions of 
this lease, or otherwise. 
33. BANKRUPTCY, INSOLVENCY OR RECEIVERSHIP. Neither 
this Lease, nor any interest therein created nor any estate 
thereby created shall pass to any trustee or receiver or 
assignees for the benefit of creditors or otherwise by 
operation of law. In the event such should occur then 
Landlord may at its option terminate this lease and all 
rights of Tenants hereunder, by giving to Tenant noice in 
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riting of the .lection of Landlord to so t.r»in.te. 
.,,..«. r»p ruTBY Landlord or Landlord's agents 
may deem necessary or oesireaoie «nu in«A* */« «**vww *» *•*« 
all material into and upon said premises that may be required 
therefore without the same constituting an eviction of Tenant 
in whole or in part. During the six months prior to the 
expiration of the term of this lease or any renewal term, 
Landlord may exhibit the premises to prospective tenanta and 
place upon the premises the usual notices "To Let" or "For 
Rent* which notices Tenant shall permit to remain thereon 
without molestation. 
35. LANDLORD'S LIEN. Tenant hereby grants to Landlord 
a lien upon the improvements, trade fixtures and furnishings 
of Tenant to secure full and faithful performance of all of 
ther terms of this lease. 
36. HOLDING OVER. Any holding over after the 
expiration of the term hereof, with the consent of the 
Landlord, shall be construed to be a tenancy from month to 
month at the rents herein specified (pro-rated on a monthly 
basis) and shall otherwise be in the terms and conditions 
herein specified so far as applicable. 
37. SUCCESSORS. All rights and liabilities herein 
given to or imposed upon the respective parties hereto shall 
extend to and bind the several respective heirsf executors, 
administrators, successors and assigns of the said parties; 
and if there shall be more than ne tenant, they shall all be 
bound jointly and severally by the terms, covenants and 
agreements herein. No rights, however, shall inure to the 
benefit of any assignee of Tenant unless the assignment to 
such assignee has been approved by Landlord in writing, which 
approval will not be unreasonably witheld. 
38. OUIET ENJOYMENT. 5*> long as Tenant is not in 
default hereunder, he may ha-'e peaceful and quiet enjoyment 
of the premises. 
39. WAIVER. One or more waivers of any covenant or 
condition by Landlord shall not be construed as a Waiver of 
subsequent breach of the same covenant or condition and the 
consent or approval to or of any subsequent similar act by 
Tenant. No breach of a covenant or condition of this Leaae 
shall be deemed to have been waived by Landlord, unless such 
waiver be in writing signed by Landlord. 
m 42#w C P 1 R E /GPEEMENT. This Lease and any exhibits 
^ u i n ! n f « t r e t 0 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ * * " * h t " ° f ' " * ^/th all the 
covenants, promises, agreements, conditions and 
i2£l5U*ndlni9i **"••» Uncord and Tenant concerning the 
leased premises and there are no oral covenants, promises, 
agreements, conditions or understandings between them other 
than are herein set forth. No subsequentalteration! 
amendment, change or addition to this Lease shall be binding 
upon Landlord or Tenant unleaa reduced to writing and signed 
by each party. 
41. NOTICES. All notices required or permitted under 
this leaae of any communication for billing, correspondence 
and any other legal purpose whatsoever shall be deemed 
effective if given in a written communication through the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, registered or certified, 
and addressed as follow*: 
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LANDLORD 2EHAHX 
Any change of address as above indicated nay be Bade by 
giving notice to the address above indicated* 
42. RECORDING. Tenant shall not record this Lease 
without the written consent of Landlord, however, upon the 
request of either party hereto, the other party shall join in 
the execution of a nemorandum or so-called "short form" of 
this Lease for the purpose of recordation. Said memorandum 
shall describe the parties, the leased premises, the tern of 
this lease, any special provisions and shall incorporate this 
lease by reference. 
43. TRANSFER OF LANDLORD'S INTERESTS. In the event of 
any transfer or transfers of Landlord's interests in the 
premises, the transferor shall be automatically relieved of 
any and all obligations and liabilities on the part of 
Landlord accruing from and after the date of such transfer, 
provided the transferee assumes such obligations and 
liabilities. 
44. SEVERABILITY. if any term, condition or covenant 
of this lease or the application thereof to any person or 
circumstance shall be invalid or unenforcibie, the remainder 
of this Lease or circumstances other than those as to which 
it has been held invalid or unenforciMe, shall be uneffected 
thereby and each term, covenant or condition of this lease 
shall be valid and be enforced to the fullest extent 
permitted by law. 
WITNESSES: LANDLORD:
 / 
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CASE AUTHORITY 
Case attached. 
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AIGNER v. COWELL SALES CO. 
Chtatt60fJMN7 (Cola IMS) 
xnents, which had been filed with the court 
prior to the habeas corpus hearing, satisfied 
the constitutional requirement of probable 
cause in an extradition proceeding, e~g., 
Michigan v. Doran, supra; Pippin v. Leach, 
188 Colo. 385, 534 ?2d 1193 (1975), and the 
statutory requirements of the Uniform 
Criminal Extradition Act, section 1S-19-
104, C.R.S.1973 (1978 RepLVoL 8). Because 
a prima facie case for extradition had been 
established, the burden devolved upon 
Lucero to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence either that he was not a fugitive 
from Kansas or that he was not substantial-
ly charged with a crime in that state. Kg., 
Lomax v. Cronin, 194 Colo. 523, 575 P.2d 
1285 (1978); Dressel v. Bianco, 168 Colo. 
517, 452 P.2d 756 (1969); Capra v. Miller, 
161 Colo. 448, 422 ?2d 636 (1967). 
Before presenting any evidence on his 
own behalf, Lucero could have moved the 
court for an order dismissing the return and 
making the writ absolute on the ground 
that the extradition documents failed to 
establish the legality of his arrest and de-
tention as a fugitive. If the motion had 
been made, the court had the discretion 
either to rule on the motion at that point or 
to decline to rule until the close of all the 
evidence. See C.R.C.P. 41(bXl). In this 
case, however, Lucero failed to make any 
such motion; instead, he acquiesced in the 
burden properly plaoed upon him by the 
court. The district court concluded at the 
close of all the evidence that Lucero's testi-
mony was not sufficient to overcome the 
prima facie case established by the extradi-
tion documents on file with the court. Un-
der these circumstances there is no merit in 
Lucero's claim of procedural error. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Colo. 907 
Phil AIGNER, a/k/a Phillip R. 
Aigner, Petitioner, 
v. 
COWELL SALES COMPANY, a Colorado 
corporation, Respondent 
No. 81SC215. 
Supreme Court of Colorado, 
En Banc. 
April 4, 1983. 
Landlord brought action to recover 
against tenant for rent due under lease 
after tenant had vacated leased premises. 
The District Court, Arapahoe County, Joyce 
S. Steinhardt, J., entered judgment for 
landlord, and tenant appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, 634 P.2d 997, affirmed. Certio-
rari to review decision was granted. The 
Supreme Court, Rovira, J., held that in ab-
sence of express provision in lease granting 
landlord right, upon reentry or forfeiture, 
to look to tenant for unaccrued rent, tenant 
who vacated leased premises in compliance 
with landlord's notice to pay or quit premis-
es was not liable for rent due under lease 
agreement for subsequent months during 
which landlord was unable to rent premises. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part 
1. Landlord and Tenant *=>94(3) 
Generally, notice to pay or quit premis-
es constitutes an election by landlord to 
terminate lease unless notice is rendered 
ineffective by tenant's payment of rent 
2. Landlord and Tenant «=» 194(1) 
Any lease provision providing for con-
tinuing liability for rent after tenant's quit-
ting of premises pursuant to notice must be 
strictly construed. 
3. Landlord and Tenant «=» 194(1) 
In absence of express provision in lease 
granting landlord right, upon reentry or 
forfeiture, to look to tenant for unaccrued 
rent, tenant who vacated leased premises in 
compliance with landlord's notice to pay or 
quit premises was not liable for rent due 
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under lease agreement for subsequent 
months during which landlord was unable 
to rent premises. 
A. Daniel Rooney, Aurora, for petitioner. 
Phyllis G. Knight, Huntington C. Brown, 
Denver, for respondent 
ROVIRA, Justice. 
We granted certiorari to review a deci-
sion of the court of appeals holding the 
petitioner, Phil Aigner, liable for rent. Co-
well Sales Co. v. Aigner, 634 P2d 997 (Colo. 
App.1981). We affirm in part and reverse 
in part 
The respondent, Cowell Sales Co. (Cowell 
or landlord), leased two units in an Arvada 
shopping center to petitioner to be used as a 
laundry. The term of the lease was from 
May 5, 1978, until April 30, 1981. The 
monthly rent specified in the lease agree-
ment was $733.33 for one unit and $333.33 
for the other. 
On May 2, 1979, Cowell served Aigner a 
"Demand For Payment Of Rent Or Posses-
sion" because Aigner was delinquent in his 
rent. The notice stated, in pertinent part, 
that the tenant should, within three days, 
"either pay [rent due] or deliver to the 
undersigned the possession of said premis-
es." Within the three-day period specified 
in the notice, Aigner removed his equip-
ment and vacated the premises. Cowell 
then posted a "for rent" sign and on August 
1, 1979, leased the premises to a new ten-
ant 
Cowell subsequently brought an action 
against Aigner to recover rent due under 
the lease for the months of May, June, and 
July 1979. The trial court entered judg-
ment in favor of Cowell for $3,187.88, the 
full amount of the rent for these three 
months. 
Aigner appealed to the court of appeals, 
arguing that the "Demand For Payment Of 
Rent Or Possession" constituted an election 
of remedies on the part of the landlord and 
that the lease was thus terminated, reliev-
ing him of liability for subsequently accru-
ing rent The court of appeab disagreed, 
relying on certain language in the lease 
agreement 
The meaning and effect of two para-
graphs in the lease are at issue here. The 
first paragraph states, in pertinent part: 
"[I]f the rent above reserved, or any part 
thereof, shall be in default . . . the said 
landlord may declare this lease terminate 
ed, and after the expiration of three days 
from the date of the service of a written 
notice to that effect, be entitled to the 
possession of said premises without any 
further notice or demand " 
The relevant part of the second para-
graph states: 
"\J]n case said premises are left vacant 
and any part of the rent herein reserved 
be due and unpaid, then the landlord 
may, without in anywise being obliged so 
to do, and without terminating the lease, 
retake possession of said premises and 
rent the same for such rent, and upon 
such conditions as the landlord may think 
best, making such changes and repairs as 
may be required, giving credit for the 
amount of rent so received less all ex-
penses of such changes and repairs, and 
said tenant shall be liable for the balance 
of the rent herein reserved until the expi-
ration of this lease." 
The court of appeals held that the second 
quoted paragraph gave the landlord the 
right to collect rent accruing after Aigner 
quit the premises. However, we do not 
believe that this paragraph governs under 
the circumstances of this case. We agree 
with the dissent in the court of appeals that 
the second paragraph applies only when the 
tenant unilaterally vacates or abandons the 
premises and the landlord does not accept 
the premises as a surrender. 
[1] The general rule in Colorado is that 
a notice to pay or quit constitutes an elec-
tion by the landlord to terminate the lease 
unless the notice is rendered ineffective by 
the tenant's payment of rent Barlow v. 
Hoffman, 103 Colo. 286, 86 P.2d 239 (1938). 
The facts in Barlow are similar to those in 
the case before us. Hoffman leased certain 
property to Barlow, who fell behind in his 
FLIGHT SYSTEMS, INC. 
QUuMOPidM 
rent Hoffman sent a notice to pay or quit 
We held that the lessor's notice was "analo-
gous to a notice which one who is a party to 
any terminable contract gives in order to 
rescind it at law, as distinguished from eq-
uity." 103 Colo, at 291, 86 ?2d at 241. We 
relied on section 4, c 70, '35 C.S.A., which 
provided that "a failure to pay such rent, 
upon demand, whenever made, shall work a 
forfeiture." This language is essentially 
the same as the present section 13-40-
104(lXd), C.R.S.1973. Moreover, the appli-
cable provisions of the lease and the de-
mand to pay or quit in Barlow were sub-
stantially identical to those in the case be-
fore us. 
The court of appeals held that the gener-
al rule concerning the effect of such notice 
was avoided by the second paragraph quot-
ed above, which stated that if the premises 
were "left vacant" the landlord could take 
possession and hold the tenant liable for 
subsequent rent. 
[2,3] Any lease provision providing for 
continuing liability for rent after the ten-
ant's quitting of the premises pursuant to 
notice must be strictly construed. Knight 
v. OMI Corp., 174 Mont. 72, 568 P.2d 552 
(1977); Walling v. Christie & Hobby, Inc., 
54 S.W^d 186 (Tex.CivApp.1932). As the 
Supreme Court of Montana stated in 
Knjght, supra, "In the absence of clear lan-
guage expressly preserving such right, 
courts generally will not construe a lease as 
providing that, upon reentry or forfeiture, 
the tenant shall remain liable for unaccrued 
rent" 174 Mont, at 75, 568 PJ2d at 554. 
There is no such express provision in the 
lease at issue here. Consequently the gen-
eral rule applies, and the tenant is liable for 
rent only through the date he quit the 
premises. 
The judgment of the court of appeals is 
therefore reversed to the extent that it 
provided for rent after Aigner quit the 
premises, and affirmed to the extent that it 
provided for rent prior to that date. 
y. ELGOOD-MAYO CORP. Colo. 909 
» (CotaJtpp. 1*82) 
KEY NUMBIR SYSTEM ff E*> 
FLIGHT SYSTEMS, INC, Plaintiff-Ap-
pellee and Cross-Appellant, 
• . 
ELGOOD-MAYO CORP- Defendant-Ap-
pellant and Cross-Appellee. 
No. 80CA0705. 
Colorado Court of Appeals, 
Div. II. 
Dec. 16, 1982. 
Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1983. 
Seller of electric control panels brought 
action for balance of purchase price. The 
District Court, City and County of Den-
ver, George M. McNamara, J., entered judg-
ment from which both seller and buyer 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Van Cise, 
J., held that: (1) material alteration pro-
posed for addition to sales contract was not 
expressly agreed to by seller and did not 
become part of contract; (2) Court of Ap-
peals would not disturb trial court's finding, 
based on conflicting evidence, as to amount 
of credit or setoff to be allowed; (3) inter-
est on amount of judgment for purchase 
price of panels was recoverable from date 
amount became due; and (4) trial court 
erred in basing principal amount of judg-
ment on "target price" of panels. 
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in 
part, and cause remanded with directions. 
1. Appeal and Error «=» 1010.1(10) 
Trial court's finding that purchase or-
der was not contract, but mere confirma-
tion of oral contract, and that provision in 
purchase order calling for acceptance by 
third party was not part of contract, but 
merely proposal for addition to contract, 
being based on competent evidence, was 
binding on review. 
2. Sales «=>22(4) 
Proposal for addition to sales contract, 
making payment for goods contingent upon 
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